

Model of Price and Frequency Competition in Freight Transportation

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Key Freight Industry Characteristics


- numerous small players with low market concentrations
- spot market price competition coupled with short-term and long-term contracts between shippers and carriers
- crucial importance of timing of pick-ups and deliveries, especially for just-in-time production processes
- generalized model applicable to all modes of freight transport

Key Components of the Model

- Freight carriers competing in
 - price
 - frequency (service quality parameter)
- Producers of goods being transported
- Schedule delay : time gap between production and shipping
- Cost of schedule delay / cost of holding inventory
- Brand loyalty : preference of producers toward carriers

Modeling Cost of Schedule Delay

Preferred departure time drawn from a uniform distribution on a circle of circumference T



δ inventory holding cost per unit output per unit time

$\frac{\gamma}{f} = \frac{\delta T}{2f}$ per unit cost of schedule delay

$p + \frac{\gamma}{f}$ full price per unit of transportation services

Producers' Problem

(Representative Firm)

Producers' Profit Function:

$$R = \left[r - p - \frac{\gamma}{f} \right] Q - E(Q)$$

Q quantity of output produced

r unit price of output

$p + \frac{\gamma}{f}$ full price per unit of transportation services

$E(Q)$ production cost as a function of output

Profit-maximizing Q and R are functions of $\left[r - p - \frac{\gamma}{f} \right]$

Producers' Problem

(Representative Firm) (contd.)

Producers' utility function:

$$u(R_i, a_i) = a_i R_i = a_i R \left[r - p_i - \frac{\gamma}{f_i} \right]$$

a_i brand loyalty parameter representing producer's preference for carriers $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$

R_i profits of producer given its choice of carrier i

A producer chooses carrier i to ship its product iff

$$u(R_i, a_i) > u(R_j, a_j) \quad j = 2, 3, \dots, n$$

$$a_j < \frac{a_i R [r - p_i - \gamma/f_i]}{R [r - p_j - \gamma/f_j]} = \frac{a_i R_i}{R_j}$$

Carriers' Problem

(Representative Carrier)

Carrier i 's objective function:

$$\max_{f_i, p_i, s_i} \pi = p_i q_i - f_i C(s_i)$$

subject to $f_i s_i = q_i$

q_i total quantity of good transported by Carrier 1

$p_i q_i$ total revenue earned by carrier i

$C(s_i)$ cost of operation per vehicle

s_i tonnage capacity of a vehicle

$f_i C(s_i)$ carrier i 's total cost of operation

Functional Form Assumptions

- Producers's cost function

$$E(Q) = Q^\beta \quad (\beta > 1)$$

resulting in

$$u(a_i, R_i) = a_i \delta \left[r - p_i - \frac{\gamma}{f_i} \right]^{\frac{\beta}{\beta-1}}$$

- Uniform distribution for brand loyalty
- Carriers' cost function

$$C(s_i) = \theta + \tau s_i$$

Substituting $s_i = q_i/f_i$ from capacity constraint,

$$\text{Carriers' total cost} = f_i \theta + \tau q_i$$

Optimization Problem

$$\pi_1 = \left(\frac{1}{\beta}\right)^{\frac{1}{\beta-1}} \frac{M(p_1 - \tau) (r - p_1 - \gamma/f_1)^{\frac{(n-1)\beta+1}{\beta-1}}}{n \prod_{j \neq 1} (r - p_j - \gamma/f_j)^{\frac{\beta}{\beta-1}}} - \theta f_1$$

- Take first order conditions with respect to p_1 and f_1
- Solve for a symmetric Nash equilibrium where
$$p_1 = p_2 = \dots = p_n = p \quad \text{and} \quad f_1 = f_2 = \dots = f_n = f$$
- Derive analytical results for the case when $\beta = 2$
- Simulate results for other values of β

Comparative Statics

Short-run Comparative Static Effects

| Variable: Parameter: | Frequency (f) | Price (p) | Full Price ($p + \gamma/f$) | Capacity (s) |
|----------------------------|----------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|
| Market Size (M) | + | + | - | + |
| Fixe Cost (θ) | - | - | + | + |
| Marginal Cost (τ) | - | + | + | - |
| Product Price (r) | + | + | + | + |
| Cost of Delay (γ) | + | - | + | - |
| Competitors (n) | - | - | - | + |

Model Extensions

- Solving for long-term equilibrium

$$\pi_{long-run} = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \text{endogenous } n$$

- Comparing equilibrium results with socially optimal outcomes

$$p_{equi} > p_{opt} \quad \text{and} \quad f_{equi} < f_{opt}$$

- Explaining excess capacity (empty miles) as an equilibrium choice made by carriers
 - in the existence of a minimum capacity constraint, empty miles can only be eliminated through a reduction in frequency

Applications of the Model

The model framework can be used to analyze changing industry dynamics in several scenarios; examples:

- deregulation and its impacts on industry dynamics
- effect of outsourcing in the face of globalization
- adoption of just-in-time production processes
- changing tax and toll structures
- responsiveness to oil price changes